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THE LEGALITY OF DISTRIBUTOR INCENTIVE
DISCOUNT PLANS UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
THOMAS A. PIRAINO, JR.*
We are convinced that . . . there are no overtones of business buc-
caneering in the Section 2(a) phrase "discriminate in price." Rather, a
price discrimination within the meaning of that provision is merely a
price difference.'
The Robinson-Patman Act was intended to provide small businesses
with protection from abuses by large, powerful business, but legitimate
price competition is not such an abuse. Neither the Act nor any social
value compels the sheltering of an individual competitor, at the expense
of the public interest, from the competitive process.2
The above quotations illustrate the inherent conffict between the
anti-price discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act3 and
the general policy of the antitrust laws favoring aggressive price compe-
tition. It is frequently difficult for practitioners and the courts to recon-
cile the equal treatment of customers mandated by the Robinson-
Patman Act with the types of individual pricing policies required in a
competitive marketplace.4 This difficulty is particularly apparent in the
case of sales incentive plans under which a seller grants his distributors
varying price discounts in consideration of their achieving certain pro-
motional goals. Although such plans appear to enhance competition
by giving each distributor an incentive to aggressively promote the
seller's products, the plans are also likely to result in competing distrib-
utors receiving different prices for identical goods. The successful
maintenance of such an incentive plan thus appears to satisfy several of
* Counsel, Diamond Shamrock Corporation. J.D., Cornell Law School, 1974. Member,
Ohio State Bar.
1. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1959).
2. Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. of Nev. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., [1977-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) [
61,290, at 70,925 (10th Cir.).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b (1976).
4. See Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 63 (1953), in which the Court cautioned
against interpreting the Robinson-Patman Act in a manner that might "give rise to a price uni-
formity and rigidity in open conflict with the purposes of other antitrust legislation."
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the substantive prerequisites of a Robinson-Patman Act violation.5
This Article will examine whether such sales incentive plans neverthe-
less may be justified under the "availability" defense which has been
judicially engrafted into the Robinson-Patman Act.6
I. THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
The Robinson-Patman Act, enacted by Congress in 1936 as an
amendment to the Clayton Act, was intended to protect smaller in-
dependent merchants against suppliers' discriminatory pricing and pro-
motional practices favoring larger retailers, such as chain stores.7 In
interpreting the Act, courts and commentators have repeatedly empha-
sized that Congress' objective was to assure that all buyers, regardless
of size, competing directly for the same customers would receive even-
handed treatment from their suppliers.8
Section 2(a) of the Act prohibits a seller from discriminating in price
5. See Section I infra for a discussion of the substantive elements of a Robinson-Patman
Act violation.
6. Although this Article will examine only the legality of sales incentive plans under the
Robinson-Patman Act, such plans may also raise questions under other antitrust provisions. A
sales incentive plan that requires a customer to purchase all of his requirements from the seller to
qualify for a discount may constitute an illegal requirements contract under Sherman Act § I and
Clayton Act § 3, when the requisite adverse effect upon competition is present. See, e.g., Standard
Fashion Co. v. Margrane Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922) (discount only to customers who
agreed not to buy competitive clothing patterns); Carter Carburetor Corp. v. FTC, 112 F.2d 722
(8th Cir. 1940) (discount not available to customers who dealt in competitor's product line);
United States v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 83 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Ill., 1949) (discount only to custom-
ers who agreed to buy total requirements from seller). See also In re Penick & Ford, Ltd., 14
F.T.C. 261 (1930) (promotional allowances available only to distributors who agreed not to carry
competing products). If, however, a customer can qualify for a discount under a sales incentive
plan without purchasing all of his requirements for the relevant product from a particular seller,
the plan should raise no questions under the Sherman and Clayton Act provisions. See, e.g.,
Hammond Ford, Inc.v. Ford Motor Co., [1966] Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,689 (S.D.N.Y.) (no viola-
tion when agreement required dealer to develop sales to seller's satisfaction and did not expressly
prohibit purchases from competitors); Beloit Culligan Soft Water Serv., Inc. v. Culligan, Inc.,
[1959] Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,255 (N.D. Ill.) (no violation when dealer required to purchase only
portion of its requirements from seller).
7. See C. AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBIN-
SON-PATMAN ACT 6-11 (2d rev. ed. 1959); Hearings on HR 8442, 4995, and5062 Before the House
Comtm on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., Ist Sess., 5-6 (1935) (comments of Representative Patman);
Hearings Before the Special House Comm on Investigation of 4merican Retail Federation, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
8. See FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960); Automatic Canteen Co. v.
FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 63, 73-74 (1953); FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., [1976-2] Trade
Cas. (CCH) 61,103 (2d Cir.); C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 630 (1959); CON-
FERENCE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT 177-81
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between competing purchasers in contemporaneous interstate sales of
goods of like grade and quality if that price discrimination may have
an adverse effect upon competition.9 To prevail under this section, a
complainant must prove, among other things, that there has been a dis-
crimination in price and that the discrimination has caused the requi-
site anticompetitive effect.' 0 Other relevant portions of the Act include
the remainder of section 2(a) and section 2(b),I t which provide for vari-
ous defenses to price discrimination charges, including cost justifica-
tion' 2 and the good faith meeting of competition,' 3 and sections 2(d) t4
and 2(e),' 5 which prohibit a seller from granting promotional al-
lowances or services to any customer unless he makes those allowances
or services available to all competing customers on proportionally
equal terms.' 6  Section 2(c) of the Act,' 7 which prohibits certain
dummy brokerage charges, section 2(f),' 8 which prohibits a buyer's
knowing inducement of a price concession, and section 3,19 which pro-
vides criminal sanctions for certain predatory price discriminations,
should not be applicable to sales incentive plans20 and therefore will
not be discussed in this Article.
(1955); Rowe, Price Differentialand Product Differentiation.- The Issues under the Robinson-Patman
Act, 66 YALE L.J. 1, 34 & n.141 (1956); 1963 DUKE L.J. 145, 152.
9. The relevant portions of the section provide:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such com-
merce,. . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality, where either or any of the purchasers involved in such discrimination
are in commerce, where . . . the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them ....
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
10. See Hanson v. PPG Indus., Inc., 482 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136
(1974); Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964); Alexander v. Texas Co.,
165 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. La. 1958).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. § 13(d).
15. Id. § 13(e).
16. Section 2(d) (15 U.S.C. § 13(d)) prohibits a seller from discriminating in reimbursing
buyers for promotional or advertising expenses, and section 2(e) (15 U.S.C. § 13(e)) includes a
similar prohibition against the furnishing of promotional or advertising services directly by a
seller to his buyers. It is not necessary under either section to prove that the discriminatory pro-
motional allowances or services had an adverse effect upon competition.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976).
18. Id. § 13(0.
19. Id. § 13(a).
20. Section 2(f) should not be applicable because it would be unlikely for a seller to imple-
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II. THE AVAILABILITY DEFENSE
The availability defense, as developed by the courts, the Federal
Trade Commission, and the commentators, precludes a finding of ille-
gality whenever a seller makes the lowest of two or more varying prices
equally available to all of his competing customers, regardless of
whether those customers actually choose to take advantage of the pre-
ferred price.2' The defense derives from a recognition that the Robin-
son-Patman Act was designed to insure equality of treatment of
customers and that, provided each customer has been given an equal
opportunity to take advantage of a particular price concession, no cus-
tomer may later complain that he has been illegally discriminated
against.22 The availability defense does not appear anywhere in the
express language of section 2(a), but instead inheres in the equitable
ment an incentive discount plan of general application in response to the inducement of a particu-
lar buyer rather than for independent business reasons. Such an incentive plan also should not be
deemed to have been instituted with predatory intent as required by § 3. A good faith incentive
discount plan that is generally and consistently applied to all customers and that is instituted for
legitimate business objectives should not allow an inference of predatory intent. Cf. Moore v.
Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954) (defendant's maintenance of price in interstate trans-
actions while lowering price in intrastate sales supported a finding of predatory intent under § 3 of
the Robinson-Patman Act).
21. Another variation on the availability defense precludes a finding of illegality when a
buyer is able to purchase a like product from another seller at a price at least as low as the seller's
preferential price. The argument in such situations has been that the buyer's opportunity to
purchase at the lower price from another source negates the "causal nexus" between the seller's
price differential and the requisite adverse effect upon competition. See In re Ark-La-Tex Warc-
house Distribs., Inc., 62 F.T.C. 1557 (1963). At least one circuit has rejected this argument. Fowl-
er Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1969). This Article only will consider the defense
as it applies to the availability of the favored price from a particular seller, and not from alternate
sources.
22. See FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., [1976-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,103
(2d Cir.) ("the Act. . .requires equality of treatment among purchasers, but it does not require a
seller to adopt a single uniform price under all circumstances"); United Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 362 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1966); Mowery v. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, 463 F. Supp. 762
(N.D. Ohio 1976); In re National Lead Co., 49 F.T.C. 791 (1953); In re Standard Brands, Inc., 29
F.T.C. 121 (1939), aft'd, 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951). See generally C. AUSTIN, supra note 7, at 21;
E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 197-201 (1963); W. PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 16 (1963); Austern, Presumption andPercdvience about Competitive Effect
under Section 2 of the Clayton Act, 81 HARV. L. REV. 773, 797 (1968); Millstein, The Status of
"'Availability" under Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 416, 418-19
(1967); Von Kalinowski, Availabiliy as a Defense to Private Label Marketing, 39 ANTITRUST L.J.
835, 837-38 (1970); 1963 DUKE L.J. 145, 152 & n.23.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/5
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purposes of the Act.23 As one commentator has stated:
It may be contended that the essence of availability is the fair and hon-
est approach taken by the seller offering the. . . prices to all his custom-
ers. Having been offered the . . . prices, it is possible that all of his
customers would accept. . . [the lowest price]; hence, there would be no
foreseeable discrimination. The fact that two customers might pay differ-
ent prices would be fortuitous, and would not be the responsibility of the
seller.24
The concept of availability has been recognized implicitly by the
courts and the Commission since the early days of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, although the concept has only more recently been expressly
referred to as a valid defense under the Act. 5 For example, without
elaborating upon the conceptual basis of their decisions, the Commis-
sion and the courts have consistently held that a seller may offer dis-
counts on invoices paid within an accelerated period, even though
many customers may thereby fail to qualify for a price as low as that
received by their competitors.26 In certain early cases the Commission
also recognized that quantity discounts within the purchasing capabil-
23. Congress expressly provided for the availability concept in § 2(d) of the Act, which pro-
hibits the granting of promotional allowances that are not made "available to all competing cus-
tomers on proportionally equal terms." 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1976). Although § 2(e) of the Act,
which deals with promotional services undertaken by a seller on behalf of his customers, does not
contain an express reference to "availability," the courts and the Commission have construed the
section to include an availability requirement identical to that included in § 2(d). See Vanity Fair
Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480, 484-85 (2d Cir. 1962). Similarly, as a rationale for judicial
incorporation of the availability defense into § 2(a), some courts have referred to the express
wording of § 2(d) as an indication of Congress' intent that nonavailability be considered a neces-
sary element of discrimination in Robinson-Patman actions. See Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v.
FTC, 329 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964); Mueller Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963).
24. Millstein, supra note 22, at 447. See also E. KINTNER, supra note 22, at 198, where the
author, in referring to the availability defense, states that it can be argued "that no one need have
been injured by the price difference because it was equally available to all." Another commenta-
tor has stated, "If the lower price was available to the complaining purchaser, and if instead he
chose to purchase at the higher price, he is the cause of his own misfortune and has only himself to
blame." Beringer, The Validity of Discounts Granted to Dual Function Buyers Under the Robinson-
Patman Act, 31 Bus. LAW. 783, 794-95 (1976). See also Soma, Functional Discounts: A Legal-
Economic Concept Permitting New Experiments in Distribution Systems, 14 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
211, 227 (1974).
25. The concept of availability was also recognized under the anti-price discrimination provi-
sions of the original § 2 of the Clayton Act, before-that provision's amendment by the Robinson-
Patman Act. See Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., 71 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1934) (no price discrim-
ination under original § 2 when lower priced product offered for sale to all of manufacturer's
customers).
26. See Craig v. Sun Oil Co., 515 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976);
Diehl & Sons v. International Harvester Co., [1976-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,180 (E.D.N.Y.); In
Number 4]
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ity of all customers should not violate the Act, even if each customer
did not choose to take advantage of the discount.27 More recently, the
courts and the Commission have referred expressly to the concept of
availability in upholding certain price differentials.2 8
These recent cases have defined three primary elements of the availa-
bility defense. First, for the defense to apply, all competing customers
must be notified of the relevant discount and of the conditions under
which they may take advantage of the discount.2 9 Secondly, the pre-
requisites of the price concession must be objective and consistently
applied. 0 Finally, all competing customers must be capable of meeting
those prerequisites in the ordinary course of their business.3 This final
re National Lead Co., 49 F.T.C. 791 (1953); In re United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489
(1939).
27. See In re American Optical Co., 28 F.T.C. 169, 183 (1939) (upholding graduated quantity
discount whose highest brackets were achievable by average retailer). See also In re Standard
Brands, Inc., 29 F.T.C. 121, 140 (1939), a'd, 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951); In re Kraft-Phenix
Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537, 543-44 (1937).
28. See Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967); United Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 362 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1966); Mowery v. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, 463 F. Supp. 762 (N.D.
Ohio 1976); In re Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n, 70 F.T.C. 223 (1966). In Mowery the court noted:
[Tihe mere fact that a seller's pricing policies encompasses [sic] the use of discounts, or
allowances, does not necessarily mean that he is engaging in actionable price discrimina-
tion. A seller may offer discounts, allowances, et cetera, provided he makes the same
offer to all purchasers. If a seller offers the same price to all customers, there is no
actionable price discrimination, despite the fact that a buyer fails to take advantage of
any allowance that has been practically available to him.
463 F. Supp. at 776 n.17 (citing 4 J. VoN KALINOWSKl, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULA-
TION § 27.04) (emphasis in original).
29. See Century Hardware Corp. v. Acme United Corp., 467 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Wis. 1979)
(denying availability defense because seller never notified customer of criteria for qualifying for
applicable discount). The type of customer notification required for promotional allowances or
services under §§ 2(d) and (e) of the Act has been extensively litigated. See FTC v. Fred Meyer,
Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968); Alterman Foods Inc. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 993, 1001 (5th Cir. 1974); Flotill
Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 224,231 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'don other grounds, 384 U.S. 179 (1967);
Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962). The FTC has issued specific
guidelines for the manner in which notification should be effected under those sections. See 16
C.F.R. § 240 (1980). Because of the manner in which the availability requirements of §§ 2(d) and
(e) have been equated with the availability defense under § 2(a) (see note 23 supra), it is possible
that observance of the specific 2(d) and (e) notification requirements could be deemed necessary in
cases under § 2(a). See notes 85-92 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the specific
manner in which customers should be notified of discount plans under § 2(a).
30. See Mueller Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963) (denying availability defense be-
cause discounts granted by seller on ad hoc, subjective basis that favored established distributors);
Century Hardware Corp. v. Acme United Corp., 467 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Wis. 1979). See also
Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946) (illegal under § 2(e) to require customer
to perform "indeterminate aggregate of services" in order to qualify for promotional services).
31. See United Biscuit Co. of America v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1965); Moog Indus.,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/5
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element does not require a seller to make the preconditions of his dis-
count so easily achievable as to be attractive to each of his customers.
The availability defense should apply as long as each customer is eco-
nomically capable of qualifying for a price concession, even though a
customer might prefer not to take the steps necessary to do so. 32
III. THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF THE DEFENSE
Courts and commentators have generally taken two different views
of the conceptual basis of the availability defense. The first view holds
that the availability of the preferred price to all interested customers
negates any element of discrimination and therefore precludes the ap-
plicability of section 2(a) to the price differential. 33 The adherents to
this so-called "non-discrimination" theory argue that the basic thrust of
the Robinson-Patman Act is directed against inequality of treatment
and that "the intent of the Act can best be effectuated by defining price
discrimination as a price difference plus unavailability, because ine-
quality of treatment implies lack of availability of the lower price to
purchasers paying the higher price. 34 Under the nondiscrimination
theory, the initial substantive prerequisite of a section 2(a) violation is
never met when a preferential price is available to all customers, and it
therefore becomes unnecessary to consider the possible presence of the
other prerequisites, such as the existence of an adverse effect upon com-
petition. This view of availability as a threshold defense is supported
Inc. v. FTC, 11956] Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,527 (8th Cir.). See generally Austern, supra note 22, at
797.
32. See Hanson v. PPG Indus., Inc., 482 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136
(1974); United Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 362 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1966); Corn Prods. Ref. Co.
v. FTC, 144 F.2d 211, 220 (7th Cir. 1944), affd, 324 U.S. 726 (1945); In re American Optical Co.,
28 F.T.C. 169 (1939); In re Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937).
33. As one commentator has stated, "[Ilmplicit in the concept of 'discrimination' is that a net
price which is practically accessible to all is not discriminatory if some do not avail themselves of
it." F. RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 93 (1962). Seegener-
al/h C. AUSTIN, supra note 7. at 21; W. PATMAN, supra note 22, at 18; Millstein, supra note 22, at
429; Von Kalinowski, supra note 22, at 838.
34. E. KINTNER, supra note 22, at 68. F.M. Rowe has pointed out during an ABA sponsored
panel discussion that a cash discount offered to all customers who pay for a product within ten
days has never been considered a "'price discrimination" because it implies no inequality of treat-
ment of customers. 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 32, 38 (1967). See also 30 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 57-
61 (1966).
35. See C. AUSTIN, supra note 7, at 21; F. RowE, supra note 33, at 97-98.
Number 41
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by the Act's legislative history36 and by some case law.37
The second view of the conceptual basis of the availability defense
holds that the availability of the preferred price to all customers ne-
gates another substantive prerequisite of a section 2(a) violation, that is,
the "causal nexus" between the price discrimination and any injury to
competition. 38 Proponents of this theory argue that a customer's in-
dependent decision not to take advantage of a price concession that has
been offered to him, rather than the existence of the price discrimina-
tion itself, is the "proximate cause" of any resulting competitive
36. The legislative history indicates that "discrimination" under the Act was intended to
cover only those situations in which competing customers were not treated equally. As Represen-
tative Utterback, Chairman of the House Conferees, stated to the House of Representatives just
before the Bill's passage:
In its meaning as simple English, a discrimination is more than a mere difference.
Underlying the meaning of the word is the idea that some relationship exists between the
parties to the discrimination which entitles them to equal treatment, whereby the differ-
ence granted to one casts some burden or disadvantage upon the other.
80 CONG. REc. 9416 (1936). Rep. Patman agreed. 1d. at 8114.
37. Several holdings of the Commission and of the courts also lend support to the "nondis-
crimination" theory of availability. In FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., the court
stated that price differentials would not constitute a price discrimination when the differentials
were equally available to all customers. [1976-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,103 (2d Cir.). Similarly,
in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., the court stated that when a preferred
price was available to all customers "no discrimination in a legal sense is present." [1966] Trade
Cas. (CCH) 1 71,802, at 82,710 (N.D. I11.), rev'don other grounds, 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1967),
rev'd, 392 U.S. 134 (1968). See also Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., 71 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.), cer,
denied, 293 U.S. 590 (1934) (construing "price discrimination" language in § 2 of original Clayton
Act, predecessor to Robinson-Patman Act; court concluded that no price discrimination occurred
when all customers are given equal opportunity to purchase products at lower price). The Com-
mission and the courts also appear to have implicitly recognized that price differentials equally
available to all customers are not discriminatory. See, e.g., Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 144 F.2d
211, 220 (7th Cir. 1944), affd, 342 U.S. 726 (1945) (no discrimination when discount related to size
of shipping containers available to all customers); In re National Lead Co., 49 F.T.C. 791, 852,
874 (1953) (cash discounts); In re Standard Brands, Inc., 29 F.T.C. 121, 140 (1939), aj'd, 189 F.2d
510 (2d Cir. 1951) (minimum purchase requirements).
38. That the price discrimination be the proximate cause of the alleged competitive harm is
an express prerequisite of a § 2(a) violation. See American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101, 104, 106
(7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964); Shore Gas & Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co.,
224 F. Supp. 922, 924 (D.N.J. 1963); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp. 560, 565 (D. Del.), afid,
237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956). The courts have denied recovery to complainants in a number of cases
on the grounds of a failure of proof that the relevant price discrimination was the proximate cause
of the alleged competitive harm. See Atlas Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co.,
269 F.2d 950, 957-58 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1970) (injury caused by complain-
ant's own inefficient production and marketing procedures); United States v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 231 (D. Del. 1953), a #'don other grounds, 351 U.S. 377 (1956)
(competitive harm caused by such "intervening" causes as complainant's poor financial manage-
ment, inferior merchandise, and less favorable plant locations); In re Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 52
F.T.C. 1580, 1599 (1956) (customer selection determined not by price but by engineering, design,
and technical service of product).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/5
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harm.39 The so-called "causal nexus" theory is supported by the equi-
table consideration that a customer will not be allowed to complain of
a price discrimination that he himself could have avoided.'
A majority of the commentators who have considered the availabil-
ity defense espouse the causal nexus theory.41 The ascendancy of the
causal nexus theory among the commentators stems from the broad
definition of price discrimination adopted by the Supreme Court in
FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.42 In that case Anheuser-Busch had low-
ered its prices for beer in the St. Louis area, while maintaining higher
prices in other areas. The Commission alleged that this territorial price
differential had adversely affected Anheuser-Busch's competitors and
thereby violated section 2(a) in the primary fine. 43 Anheuser-Busch ar-
gued that its lower prices were not discriminatory because they were
not "below cost or unreasonably low for the purpose or design to elimi-
nate competition. . . ."I The Court rejected that argument and re-
sponded that section 2(a) was not directed merely against price
differentials instituted with predatory intent:
We are convinced that whatever may be said with respect to the rest of
2(a) and 2(b)-and we say nothing here-there are no overtones of busi-
ness buccaneering in the 2(a) phrase 'discriminate in price.' Rather, a
39. See Alexander v. Texas Co., 165 F. Supp. 53, 58 (W.D. La. 1958); 30 ABA ANTITRUST
SECTION 60 (1966) (comments of Millstein); Austern, supra note 22, at 796.
40. The availability defense goes to the point of causation. Though not expressly stated
in the Act, it seems apparent that, for the Act to be violated, the price discrimination that
is objected to must be the cause of the probable adverse competitive effect that is alleged.
If the lower price was available to the complaining purchaser, and if instead he chose to
purchase at the higher price, he is the cause of his own misfortune and has only himself
to blame.
Beringer, supra note 24, at 794-95. See also 30 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 60 (1966) (comments of
Millstein); H. SHNIDERMAN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN PERSPECTIVE 11-12 (1977); Austern, supra
note 22, at 796.
41. See generally H. SHNIDERMAN, supra note 40; Beringer, supra note 24; Millstein, supra
note 22. See also E. KINTNER, supra note 22, at 198-201; Austern, supra note 22, at 796.
42. 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
43. Primary line cases involve situations such as Anheuser-Busch in which competition
among competitors of the seller has allegedly been adversely affected as a result of the price dis-
erimination. By contrast, in secondary line cases the anticompetitive effect is among firms compet-
ing with a buyer who has received a discriminatory price. In Anheuser-Busch the Court pointed
out that section 2(a) was directed against discriminatory practices that injure sellers in the primary
line as well as against those that injure buyers in the secondary line. See 363 U.S. at 543-44.
Section 2(a) also may apply to competitive harm suffered by a buyer's customers at the third level
of competition or even by a firm purchasing from a buyer's customer at the fourth level of compe-
tition. See note 68 infra and accompanying text.
44. 363 U.S. at 546.
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price discrimination within the meaning of that provision is merely a
price difference.45
The Court's equation of a price difference with a price discrimination
has led many commentators to conclude that differing prices, even
when equally available to all customers, are discriminatory within the
meaning of the Act; therefore, the availability defense must be
grounded not upon the absence of a price discrimination but upon the
absence of a causal connection between the price discrimination and
any adverse effect upon competition.46
It is possible that the commentators may have exaggerated the im-
pact of Anheuser-Busch upon the availability defense. Anheuser-Busch
held only that territorial price discriminations may be subject to section
2(a) in primary line cases. The availability defense was not considered
by the Court and, indeed, was obviously inapplicable because custom-
ers outside the favored geographical area had not been offered
Anheuser-Busch's preferred price. It is by no means certain that the
Court would have equated a price difference with a price discrimina-
tion if the favorable price had been equally available to all customers.47
It may therefore be argued that the Supreme Court's holding in
Anheuser-Busch leaves the nondiscrimination theory of the availability
defense intact.
This argument is buttressed by the language of the Supreme Court's
holding in FTC v. Borden Co. (Borden 1).48 In that case Borden was
selling milk under private label brands as well as under the Borden
brand name and was charging a lower wholesale price for the private
branded milk than for the Borden branded milk. The Federal Trade
Commission alleged that Borden's price differential was unlawfully dis-
criminatory in both the primary and secondary lines. Borden argued
that the private branded and Borden branded milk were not "of like
grade and quality" as required by section 2(a). The Supreme Court
held against Borden on that issue and remanded the case for a determi-
nation, among other things, of "whether the differential under attack is
discriminatory within the meaning of the Act."49 In using that lan-
45. Id at 549.
46. See generally Millstein, supra note 22. See also E. KINTNER, supra note 22, at 199; Aus-
tern, supra note 22, at 796.
47. See E. KINTNER, supra note 22, at 67-68; Von Kalinowski, supra note 22, at 838.
48. 383 U.S. 637 (1966).
49. Id. at 646.
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guage the Court appeared to imply that all price differences are not
necessarily discriminatory. Justice Stewart argued in his dissent that
the majority had indeed so held." Stewart also stated that if Borden
could prove on remand that the preferential price for the private
branded milk had been made available to all of Borden's customers, "it
is unlikely that price discrimination within the meaning of Section 2(a)
can be made out."'"
On remand in Borden HJ,52 the Fifth Circuit indeed found no viola-
tion of section 2(a) in the secondary line on the grounds that the lower
priced private branded milk had been available to all of Borden's cus-
tomers.5 3 The court appeared to rely on the causal nexus theory, how-
ever, rather than on the nondiscrimination theory, emphasizing the
Anheuser-Busch doctrine that all price differences are discriminatory. 4
The Borden I and Borden II decisions indicate that the availability
defense remains viable in secondary line cases despite the Supreme
Court's broad definition of price discrimination in Anheuser-Busch.
The decisions do not, however, completely clarify whether the concep-
tual basis of the availability defense should derive from the absence of
the element of discrimination or the element of causation.5 6 Borden I
50. Justice Stewart stated in dissent:
It is not clear that the 'injury to competition' and 'cost justification' issues will be
reached on the remand. As the opinion of the Court suggests,. . . the existence of price
discrimination is an issue that remains open in the Court of Appeals. If Borden is able to
demonstrate that the price differential between its premium and private label brands is
not a price discrimination, the inquiry by the Commission is at an end, and no issue of
injury to competition or cost justification under 2(a) is reached. Nothing in FTC v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, a case concerned only with territorial price discrimi-
nation, requires an equation in all circumstances between a price differential and price
discrimination.
383 U.S. at 659 n.17 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967).
53. The court pointed out that no customer who asked to purchase private branded milk was
denied the right to purchase it at the lower price. 381 F.2d at 180. See notes 60-62 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of the court's primary line holding.
54. 381 F.2d at 177.
55. The Borden cases have, in fact, been cited as authority for the legality of a dual pricing
system made equally available by a seller to all of his customers. In FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., [1976-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,103, at 69,999 (2d Cir.), for example, the court,
in upholding such a pricing system, stated that the Supreme Court had recognized in Borden I
that "the difference in price would not fall under the Act's ban on price discrimination if all
purchasers were given an equal opportunity to purchase the less expensive milk."
56. See 30 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 57-61 (1966); E. KlriNtNeR, supra note 22, at 68.
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appears to support the nondiscrimination theory of the defense, while
Borden II appears to support the causal nexus theory.
A. Consequences in Primary Line Cases
The uncertainty of the courts and commentators concerning the con-
ceptual basis of the availability defense may involve more than mere
semantics. If "availability" means that there is no discrimination, then
there can be no violation of the Act at any competitive level, because
the initial requirement for the application of the Act has not been
met.57 If, however, availability is viewed in terms of disruption of the
causal nexus between the price discrimination and competitive harm to
a customer who has chosen not to take advantage of a discount, the
defense may not apply in the primary line to competitors of the seller
who, of course, do not have the opportunity to determine whether the
preferred price will be availed of. It may be argued in such a case that
no event has occurred in the primary line that would negate the causal
nexus between the price discrimination and an adverse effect upon
competition in that line.5
Borden II and a discussion of the availability defense by Ira Mill-
stein in an influential 1967 article59 suggest a method of analysis by
which a price differential nevertheless might be justified in primary line
cases under the causal nexus theory. In Borden I1 the Fifth Circuit, in
addition to upholding the price differential between the private label
milk and Borden's own branded milk in the secondary line, also con-
cluded that the price differential did not violate the Act in the primary
line.60 The court reasoned that any adverse competitive effect in the
primary line was not caused by the price difference between the private
label milk and Borden's own branded milk.61 The fact that Borden
happened to sell its own branded milk at a higher price had no effect on
competition in the distinct private label market. In the absence of any
57. See F. RowE, supra note 33, at 95-98. See also 30 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 58-59
(1966) (statement of Francis C. Mayer).
58. See Continental Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., [1973-1] Trade Cas. (CCH)
74,433, at 93,951 (10th Cir.), in which the court stated in dicta: "It would appear that the availa-
bility doctrine or defense is peculiarly inappropriate or inapplicable to a primary line case such as
this. ... See also 30 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 60 (1966) (comments of Millstein).
59. Millstein, The Status ofAvailability under Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 42
N.Y.U. L. REv. 416 (1967).





indication that Borden had used the higher prices for its own branded
milk to subsidize the lower prices for the private label milk, the court
could find no relationship between Borden's higher and lower prices.62
Any injury to competition in the primary line was thus caused not by
Borden's price differential, but by its competitors' own inability to com-
pete effectively with Borden in the sale of private label milk.
Millstein argues similarly in his article that a competitor should not
be able to prevail in a primary line case unless he can prove that the
dtfference in the prices charged by the seller caused competitive harm
in the primary line.6 3 Millstein points out that it would be contrary to
the intent of the Act to allow a competitor of the seller to claim compet-
itive harm as a result of the seller's lower prices alone, because only
price differences are considered to be discriminatory under the Act.'
Thus the competitor should be required to prove some relationship be-
tween the seller's prices that caused competitive harm, such as the fact
that a seller's lower prices to certain customers were subsidized by
higher prices to other customers. In that case, the price differential
would be responsible for the seller's ability to create an adverse com-
petitive effect in the primary line.65 Unless the competitor could show
such a relationship between the seller's higher and lower prices, he
could only claim competitive injury as a result of the seller's lower
prices alone; he could not claim that he had been harmed by the seller's
price differential as required by the Act.
It probably would be impossible to infer the requisite relationship
between a seller's different prices in a primary line case when a seller
makes a discount equally available to all of his customers. In making
the discount available, the seller would be indicating his willingness to
sell to each customer at the lower price, and that willingness should
negate any inference that the seller intended to use his higher prices to
62. Id. at 177.
63. Millstein, supra note 22, at 443-44. See also Austern, supra note 22, at 796, in which the
author summarized such a primary line analysis as follows: "Th[e] economic postulate is that
where complete availability of the two prices exist, neither the seller's competitor nor the seller's
customers are being injured by the discrimination; any injury is attributable to 'the simple fact of
the lower price."'
64. See Millstein, supra note 22, at 443-44.
65. See id. See also C. AUSTIN, supra note 7, at 44. The courts have held that the subsidiza-
tion must be proven in primary line cases involving geographic price differentials in order to
establish a causal link between those differentials and the requisite effect upon competition in the
primary line. See Shore Gas & Oil Co. v. Humble Oil and Ref. Co., 224 F. Supp. 922 (D.N.J.
1963).
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certain customers to subsidize lower prices to other customers.66 It thus
appears that, pursuant to the analysis of Millstein and Borden II, price
discounts equally available to all customers may be upheld in primary
line cases even under the causal nexus approach to the availability de-
fense.
The absence of detailed precedent makes it uncertain whether a
court inclined toward the causal nexus theory would use such a method
of analysis to uphold a particular discount in a primary line case. Nev-
ertheless, the preferred view under any conceptual basis appears to be
that, because the Robinson-Patman Act mandates only equal treatment
of customers, 6 7 a seller who guarantees that equality by making his pre-
ferred price equally available to all competing customers does not vio-
late the Act in any line of commerce. 68
B. Consequences as to Burden of Proof
The conceptual basis of the availability defense may be determina-
tive of whether the burden of proof is on the complainant to show the
"non-availability" of a preferred price or on the defendant to show the
"availability" of such price. In Robinson-Patman cases the complain-
ant generally has the burden of proving each substantive element of a
section 2(a) violation, including the existence of a price discrimination
and of a causal connection between that discrimination and the alleged
competitive injury.6 9 Under the nondiscrimination theory the corn-
66. See Millstein, supra note 22, at 442.
67. See notes 8 and 22 supra and accompanying text.
68. See E. KINTNER, supra note 22, at 67-68, 199. The Robinson-Patman Act may apply to
competitive harm suffered at the third or fourth levels of competition as well as at the primary and
secondary levels. A seller has, for example, been held liable for discriminating in price against
one of his direct customers competing on the so-called fourth competitive level with a customer of
a customer of the seller's original favored purchaser to whom the preferred price was successively
passed along through the distribution chain. See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1968).
Although there is little precedent construing the availability defense in third or fourth line cases,
the defense should protect a seller in these cases when he has made the preferred price available to
the complainant. If the complainant has refused to take advantage of such an "available" price,
under either conceptual basis of the availability defense, he should be precluded from holding the
seller liable for discriminating between him and any direct or indirect customers of the seller at
the second, third, or fourth competitive levels.
69. See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648-49 (1968); Atlas Bldg. Prods. v. Dia-
mond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 957 (7th Cir. 1959), cerl. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960);
Alexander v. Texas Co., 165 F. Supp. 53, 58 (W.D. La. 1958); In re Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 52
F.T.C. 1580 (1956). In what many commentators and courts have referred to as an "aberrant"




plainant arguably has not met the initial burden of proving a price dis-
crimination until he has shown both that a price differential exists and
that the preferred price was not available to all customers.70 In con-
trast, under the causal nexus theory all price differentials are consid-
ered discriminatory; therefore the complainant arguably needs to allege
only the existence of a price differential and the fact that the differential
caused the requisite effect on competition. The burden would then
shift to the defendant to prove that the "availability" of the preferred
price negated the relationship between the price differential and the
alleged effect upon competition.7
Neither the Commission nor the courts have yet considered these ar-
guments regarding the effect of the conceptual basis of the availability
defense upon burden of proof. A definitive resolution of the question
therefore must await further decisions. In cases under sections 2(d)72
and 2(e), 71 however, the courts have held that the burden of proving
availability should be upon the defendant because the defendant is the
party seeking to take advantage of the defense. Several commentators
have concluded similarly that the unavailability of a discount under
section 2(a) may be inferred from the complainant's proof of the exist-
ence of a price differential among competing customers and that, con-
sequently, the burden is on the defendant to rebut the inference by
proving the availability of the preferred price. 4 Under both views, the
availability defense constitutes an affirmative rebuttal by the defendant
ken from the uniform holdings of the other circuits and shifted the burden to the defendant to
prove that the relevant price differential did not have the requisite competitive effect following the
complainant's proof of the mere existence of a price differential. See Enterprise Indus., Inc. v.
Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457, 460 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957); FTC v. Standard Brands,
Inc., 189 F.2d 510, 515 (2d Cir. 1951); Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378, 379 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945). The Second Circuit's singular view on burden of proof has been
widely attributed to a misreading of the procedural provisions of§ 2(b) of the Act as a substantive
definition of the elements of a prima facie case under § 2(a). See F. RowE, supra note 33, at 108-
09.
70. See E. KINTNER, supra note 22, at 67.
71. See id.
72. See Alterman Foods, Inc. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 993, 1001 (5th Cir. 1974); R.H. Macy & Co.
v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445,450 (2d Cir. 1964); Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480, 486
(2d Cir. 1962); State Wholesale Grocers v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831, 838 (7th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 947 (1959). These cases are relevant to the question of burden of
proof under § 2(a) because of the manner in which the availability concept under § 2(d) has been
equated with the § 2(a) availability defense. See note 23 supra.
73. See Mueller Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44, 47 (7th Cir. 1963).
74. See generally Millstein, upra note 22. See a/so C. AUSTIN, supra note 7, at 88; Auster,
supra note 22, at 796.
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of the section 2(a) prerequisites of price discrimination or competitive
injury.
IV. STANDARD QUANTITY DISCOUNTS UNDER
THE AVAILABILITY DEFENSE
The parameters of the availability defense have been defined most
fully in cases dealing with the standard quantity discount, under which
the seller grants a preferred price to customers in consideration of their
purchase of a specified absolute quantity of product.75 Availability
often constitutes one of a defendant's only possible defenses in stan-
dard quantity discount cases, because the statutory defenses of cost jus-
tification and meeting competition are difficult to sustain.76
In a few early cases the Commission declared quantity discounts ille-
gal on the grounds that they exerted an "inherent tying effect" by en-
couraging a customer to purchase a portion of his requirements for a
particular product from the discounting seller.77 Under the Commis-
75. Indeed, the Robinson-Patman Act was intended to preclude the discriminatory use of
quantity discounts, (see FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1948); Standard Motor
Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1959); Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, [1956] Trade Cas.
(CCH) 68,527 (8th Cir.)), and such discounts have been involved in a great number of the cases
litigated under the Act.
76. Fixed costs savings resulting from the production of incremental amounts of product
purchased by customers pursuant to cumulative quantity discounts may not be used to justify
price discounts. In that situation all customers for whom the seller produced the relevant product,
and not simply the customers purchasing the incremental amount pursuant to the quantity dis-
count, have contributed to the seller's fixed production costs savings. S. REP. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1936). See E. KINTNER, supra note 22, at 174.
The courts and the Commission also have held in some cases that a seller's meeting of competi-
tion is not in "good faith" as required by § 2(b) if the seller is meeting a competitive pricing
system as opposed, to an individual competitive situation. See FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324
U.S. 746, 758 (1945); In re Surprise Brassiere Co., 71 F.T.C. 868 (1967), aed, 406 F.2d 711, 715
(5th Cir. 1969). Under this rationale sellers have been precluded from using the meeting competi-
tion defense to justify general quantity discount plans. See Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC,
265 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959); In re Edelman Co., 51 F.T.C. 978,
1006-07 (1955), afl'd, 239 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958). See also
In re Knoll Int'l, Inc., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,768 (1971) (FTC
advisory opinion) (Commission stated that meeting competition defense of§ 2(b) would not apply
to meeting of competitive quantity discount plan). But see Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d
435, 442 (5th Cir. 1966) (meeting competitive quantity discount system permissible when complex-
ity of competitive system makes it impossible to predict in advance actual price available in spe-
cific transactions).
77. The Commission pointed out that a customer's increasing entitlement to price conces-
sions under a cumulative quantity discount exerted economic pressure tying the customer to the
seller and precluding the seller's competitors from obtaining the customer's business. In order to
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/5
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sion's analysis, such an inherent tying effect would appear to exist even
in the case of discount plans with relatively low minimum purchase
requirements. Thus, the Commission's early analysis could have re-
sulted in a per se prohibition of quantity discounts.
More recent decisions of the courts and the Commission, however,
take the less extreme view that quantity discounts do not exert an im-
permissible tying effect when, in practice, customers are able to
purchase a portion of their requirements from competitive sources and
continue to qualify for price preference.78 Nevertheless, quantity dis-
counts requiring a customer to purchase all or substantially all of his
requirements from a particular seller may still be deemed illegal under
section 2(a)79 and under other antitrust provisions8° because of their
obtain that business the competitors not only would have to match the seller's price, but also
would have to indemnify the customer for the built-up discount entitlement he would forfeit if he
switched his source of supply. See In re Simmons Co., 29 F.T.C. 727, 742 (1939); In re Standard
Brands, Inc., 29 F.T.C. 121, 139 (1939), af'd, 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951); In re Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co., 28 F.T.C. 186, 198 (1939); In re American Optical Co., 28 F.T.C. 169, 181-82 (1939).
This view of the inherent tying effect of quantity discounts was consistent with the Commission's
early holdings in primary line cases that the mere shift of business from one competitor to another
was sufficient to demonstrate such discounts' adverse effect upon competition under § 2(a). See In
re Samuel H. Moss, Inc., 36 F.T.C. 640 (1943), aft'd, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
734 (1945). Early Commission complaints under the original section 2 of the Clayton Act prior to
the Robinson-Patman amendments also reflected the belief that quantity discounts had an inher-
ent tying effect that tended to cause customers to confine their purchases largely or exclusively to a
particular seller. See In re Vacuum Oil Co., 3 F.T.C. 436 (1920); In re Corona Typewriter Co., 3
F.T.C 434 (1920); In re Underwood Type-Writer Co., 3 F.T.C. 434 (1920); In re Remington
Typewriter Co., 3 F.T.C. 434 (1920).
78. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696, 711 (7th Cir. 1968). This less extreme
approach is consistent with the more recent view of the Commission and the courts that the mere
diversion of business from one competitor to another is not sufficient to demonstrate the requisite
adverse competitive effect in a primary line Robinson-Patman case. To prevail in such a case, a
complainant must now demonstrate a substantial effect on general competition in the primary
line, rather than a mere impact upon a single competitor. In several primary line cases this ration-
ale has been used to uphold quantity discounts notwithstanding evidence of diversion of business
from a particular seller because of the discount. See Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co. v.
FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 791, 792 (7th Cir. 1951). See also In re Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C.
1580 (1956); In re Electric Auto-Lite Co., 50 F.T.C. 73 (1953); In re General Motors Corp., 50
F T.C. 54 (1953); In re Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953).
79. See In re General Ry. Signal Co., 66 F.T.C. 882 (1964) (FTC complaint charging that
quantity discounts based on cumulative annual purchases were illegal under § 2(a) because they
were "substantial enough to cause purchasers to buy all or substantially all of their requirements
of said products from one respondent in order to qualify for the maximum discounts offered by
that respondent" (case settled by consent order)). See In re Maguire Indus., Inc., 55 F.T.C. 306
(1958) (discount conditioned on customer's purchase of quantity of product equal to customer's
total requirements for product in previous year illegal under § 2(a)). See also Herman Miller,
11976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REO. REP. (CCH) 21,391 (1978) (FTC advisory opinion)
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inherent tying effect.
Quantity discounts thus are not now regarded as per se violations of
section 2(a), but as pricing plans that may be valid if certain conditions
are met.8' Generally, these discounts should be upheld under the avail-
ability defense if (1) objective guidelines clearly define the conditions
under which customers can take advantage of the discounts, (2) all
competing customers are notified of those guidelines and of their abil-
ity to qualify for discounts under the guidelines, and (3) all competing
customers are capable of qualifying for the discounts in the ordinary
course of their business.82
Objective prerequisites for quantity discounts are important not only
to give customers clear notice of the standards for qualification but also
to insure that the discounts are administered without favoritism to par-
ticular customers. The courts have stated that a seller may violate sec-
tion 2(a) if he selectively grants discounts to certain of his customers
who have failed to meet objective promotional goals or to distinguish
themselves otherwise from customers who do not receive a discount.
To comply with section 2(a), the seller must adopt specific and objec-
tive standards for discount qualification and must adhere consistently
to those standards in qualifying each of his customers who meet the
requisite promotional goals.83
(illegal under section 5 of Federal Trade Commission Act to give discounted price quotations in
bid situations only to dealers who agreed not to bid competitive products).
80. See note 6 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of how such quantity discounts
may be deemed illegal requirements contracts under Sherman Act § I and Clayton Act § 3. Fur-
thermore, if a seller conditions a quantity discount upon his customers purchasing more than one
of his products, the seller may be deemed to have coerced his customers into accepting a tying
arrangement that would be illegal under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. See Advance Business
Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 69 (4th Cir. 1969), cerl. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
Therefore, a seller probably would violate those acts by offering a quantity discount to "ful-lne"
distributors who carry all of the seller's products while refusing to make the discount available to
competing distributors who resell only one or a few of the seller's products.
81. See Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635, 643 (9th Cir. 1969); American
Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101, 104 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964); Elgin Corp. v.
Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co., 251 F.2d 7, 11 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 926 (1958); American Can
Co. v. Bruce's Juices, Inc., 187 F.2d 919, 924 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 190 F.2d 73 (5th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951); In re Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955, 962 (1959), rev'd, 294 F.2d
465 (1961), rev'd, 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
82. See notes 93-105 infra and accompanying text.
83. In Mueller Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44,46 (7th Cir. 1963), the court held that the availability
defense would not apply to a discount plan because "IT]here were no objective standards to guide
regular jobbers in qualifying. ... There was evidence that the seller had selectively qualified
only his older, more established distributors. See also Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/5
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The courts also have held that a quantity discount is not "available"
to all competing customers unless all customers are notified of the dis-
count and of the conditions under which they may take advantage of
it.84 The relevant authority indicates that a seller would be well ad-
vised to notify his customers in writing of the discount plan, in order to
prove that all customers had been informed of the plan. 5 Notification
should occur sufficiently in advance of the plan's effective date to allow
customers to take advantage of the plan and should include a specific
description of all relevant details of the plan.86 The seller should peri-
odically renew his notification efforts if certain later-acquired custom-
(2d Cir. 1946) (promotional services granted only to customers who furnished "indeterminate ag-
gregate" of services to promote seller's products were not "available" to all customers as required
by § 2(e)); Century Hardware Corp. v. Acme United Corp., 467 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Wis. 1979)
(discount not "functionally available" unless objective standards exist to guide customers in quali-
fying for discount).
84. See, e.g., Century Hardware Corp. v. Acme United Corp., 467 F. Supp. 350, 355-56 (E.D.
Wis. 1979). The courts and the Commission have specifically defined the manner in which a seller
should notify customers of promotional allowances and services to insure the requisite "availabil-
ity" under §§ 2(d) and (e). Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964); Muel-
ler Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963). See Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other
Merchandising Payments and Services, 16 C.F.R. § 240 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Commission
Guides]. A seller may have to comply with similar notification requirements in order to prevail
under the availability defense in a § 2(a) case. See note 29 supra. The early 2(d) and (e) cases
merely emphasized that promotional allowances and services that had been concealed from cus-
tomers had not been made "available" as required by the Act. See, e.g., In re N. Erlanger, Blum-
gart & Co., 46 F.T.C. 1139, 1142 (1950). More recent cases, however, make it clear that a seller
has an affirmative obligation to notify his competing customers of the essential details of promo-
tional offers. See Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480, 485 (2d Cir. 1962); In re
Chestnut Farms Chevy Chase Dairy, 53 F.T.C. 1050, 1060 (1957); In re Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 52
F.T.C 1535, 1548 (1956); In re Kay Windsor Frocks, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 89, 95 (1954).
85. Some courts have held that it is at least theoretically possible to administer fairly a pro-
motional program that has been orally communicated to customers. See In re House of Lord's,
Inc., 69 F.T.C. 44 (1966). The Commission Guides, supra note 84, however, implemented under
§§ 2(d) and (e), note that written notification of a plan is desirable to prove receipt of the notifica-
tion by each of a seller's customers. 16 C.F.R. § 240.8(a) (1980). See also Kintner, Merchandising
Allowances and Services, Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 364, 366 (1966).
86. See 16 C.F.R. § 240.8(a) (1980). Thus, the Commission Guides stop just short of requir-
ing a seller to make an individual formal offer of his promotional plan to each customer. In
Alterman Foods, Inc. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 993, 1001 (5th Cir. 1974), the court implied that a seller
might be required actually to offer his promotional plan to all customers. After holding that
§§ 2(d) and (e) required the seller to take affirmative action to inform his customers of the availa-
bility of the plan, the court added: "Thus, while promotional benefits received may be considered
in determining proportional equality, the basic question is one of proportionality of offers." (em-
phasis added). See also Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962); In re
Chestnut Farms Chevy Chase Dairy, 53 F.T.C. 1050 (1957); In re Kay Windsor Frocks, Inc., 51
F.T.C. 89 (1954).
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ers would be unlikely to be adequately informed of the plan by a one-
step notification process."
Sellers have been required to notify each of their competing custom-
ers of a quantity discount even when it appeared that certain customers
would be uninterested in the discount.88 The courts and the Commis-
sion have excused sellers from this requirement only when notification
clearly would have been futile because a customer would have been
unwilling to comply with the prerequisites of the discount.89
Under the "indirect purchaser" doctrine adopted by the Commission
and the courts, competing customers entitled to receive notification of a
quantity discount should be deemed to include all customers who com-
pete in the resale of the seller's product at each functional level of the
distribution chain in which the seller makes his discount directly avail-
able to any customer, regardless of whether those customers purchase
the product directly from the seller or indirectly through wholesalers or
other intermediaries.9" If, for example, a seller offers a quantity dis-
count directly to a retail customer, or allows an integrated wholesaler-
87. See 16 C.F.R. § 240.8(a) (1980).
88. See Century Hardware Corp. v. Acme United Corp., 467 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
89. See id. at 356.
90. See FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968); 16 C.F.R. § 240.3(b) (1980). Under
the "indirect purchaser" doctrine adopted by the Commission and the courts, a seller may have to
take extra steps to insure the availability of a discount at any additional distribution levels to
which he directly markets his product. If, for example, the seller markets his product directly at
the wholesale and retail levels, and makes a discount available only to his direct-buying retailers,
he may be deemed to have discriminated against competing retailers who purchase the product at
a higher price from one of his wholesale customers. Such retailers have been viewed as "indirect
purchasers" of the seller for Robinson-Patman purposes. See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395
U.S. 642 (1968); FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968). There is also authority under
which a seller could be deemed to have discriminated against a direct-buying retailer competing
with another retailer who has been able to purchase the product at a lower price from a wholesale
customer of the seller. See In re Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945), modified, 43 F.T.C. 56
(1946), modifled andaf'd, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd and remanded on oiher grounds, 450
U.S. 231 (1951). Possibly, therefore, a seller directly distributing his product both at the wholesale
and retail level may be required to supervise his wholesalers to insure that (1) the advantages of a
retail discount plan are made available to retailers purchasing through the wholesalers, and (2) the
wholesalers do not pass a price advantage along to retailers competing with the seller's direct-
buying retailers. These requirements may encourage a seller to maintain the resale prices of his
wholesalers and thus to commit a violation of the Sherman Act. See In re Standard Oil Co., 49
F.T.C. 923 (1953), rev'd, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956), a'fd, 355 U.S. 396 (1958). Courts and
commentators have criticized this requirement that a seller supervise his distributors to insure that
indirect purchasers receive no undue benefit or disadvantage in pricing. See id. at 957 & n.l; F.
ROWE, supra note 33, at 200. Therefore, it is unclear whether a court would actually require a
seller to so supervise distributors under a price discount program.
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retailer to take advantage of the discount with respect to retail sales, the
seller also may be required to offer the discount to all other firms com-
peting with that customer on the retail level, including those retailers
who purchased directly from the seller and those who purchased indi-
rectly through his wholesale distributors.9" If, however, a seller offers a
quantity discount only with respect to wholesale sales, and that dis-
count meets the other criteria of "availability" discussed earlier in this
Article, the seller should not be required to offer the discount to any
retail customers of his wholesale distributors, even though some of
those customers may be disadvantaged in purchasing from distributors
who choose not to take advantage of the discount.92 By limiting a
quantity discount to wholesale transactions, a seller therefore may
avoid a possible extension of his liability to indirect purchasers at dis-
tant distribution levels.
Finally, in order to utilize the availability defense, a seller must
demonstrate that each competing customer has the inherent capability
to qualify for a quantity discount in the ordinary course of his business.
The Commission and the courts have emphasized that, unless a cus-
tomer has that capability, the offer of a promotional plan is a mere
pretense and is tantamount to no offer at all. 9 3
The Supreme Court, in FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,94 established a
framework for analyzing customers' capabilities of qualifying for quan-
tity discounts. In that case only five of Morton Salt's 4,000 customers
were able to qualify for a discount determined by the cumulative an-
nual volume of the customers' salt purchases. Morton Salt argued that,
in contrast to a system of hidden or special rebates, the discount plan
was disclosed to all of its customers and, therefore, was equally avail-
able to each. The Court pointed out that mere disclosure of the plan
was insufficient to prove availability and held the plan illegal under
section 2(a) because it was not accessible on a practical basis to most
91, See note 90 supra.
92. In such a case the distributors' opportunity to take advantage of the discount should be
deemed either to negate any element of discrimination or to disrupt the causal nexus between the
seller's price differential and injury to competition on the retailers' distribution level. See FLM
Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., [1976-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,103 (2d Cir.).
93. For example, in State Wholesale Grocers v. Great AtL & Pac. Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831, 839
(7th Cir. 1958), a case construing the availability of a promotional allowance under § 2(d), the
court stated, "An offer to make a service available to one, the economic status of whose business
renders him unable to accept the offer, is tantamount to no offer to him."
94. 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
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customers. The Court concluded: "[T]heoretically, the discounts are
equally available to all, but functionally they are not. ' 9
5
The question of whether a quantity discount is "functionally avail-
able" to all competing customers as required by Morton Salt has arisen
in several cases under section 2(a).96 In some cases it was clear on the
face of the discount plan that the plan prerequisites were not actually
achievable by the seller's average small purchasers. In those situations
the Commission concluded that a plan that automatically excludes
small purchasers on the basis of the inherent nature of their business
does not meet the requirement of functional availability.97 The Com-
mission has, for example, invalidated discounts that escalate in accord-
ance with the amount of customers' total requirements for a particular
product, emphasizing that customers with lesser requirements necessar-
ily would be precluded from taking advantage of the higher dis-
counts.98 Quantity discounts requiring the purchase of amounts of
product clearly in excess of the capabilities of smaller purchasers also
have been found illegal on a similar rationale.99 A discount plan re-
quiring customers to purchase all or substantially all of their require-
ments from the seller also may be deemed presumptively unavailable
to certain customers, particularly if those customers can demonstrate
legitimate business reasons for requiring competitive products. "
95. Id. at 42.
96. A similar concept of functional availability has been developed for promotional al-
lowances and services under §§ 2(d) and (e), whose concept of availability has often been equated
with the availability defense under § 2(a). See note 23 supra. Indeed, the Commission Guides
incorporate a requirement of "functional availability" similar to that in Morton Sall. The Guides
state that a promotional plan must be "usable in a practical sense by all competing customers" and
must not by its nature preclude certain customers from participating. See 16 C.F.R. § 240.9(a)
(1980).
97. See In re Standard Brands, Inc., 29 F.T.C. 121, 140 (1939), a4 'd, 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.
1951); See In re American Optical Co., 28 F.T.C. 169, 183 (1939). See also C. AUsTIN, Supra note
7, at 21.
98. See In re International Salt Co., 49 F.T.C. 138 (1952) (discounts based upon amount of
customers' purchases from all sources during previous twelve months); In re Ferro Enamel Corp.,
42 F.T.C. 36 (1946) (same); In re Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 30 F.T.C. 1209 (1940) (discounts based on
customers' monthly requirements of product).
99. In Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, [1959] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,338 (2d Cir.), for
example, the court found illegal a discount plan under which the maximum discount was avail-
able only on cumulative annual purchases in excess of $I00,000. That quantity clearly exceeded
the purchasing capacity of several smaller customers.
100. As discussed in notes 77-79 and accompanying text, supra, discount plans requiring a
customer to purchase all or substantially all of his requirements for a product from a particular
seller have been deemed illegal in the primary line because of their "inherent tying effect" which
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/5
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In other cases, the practical ability of smaller customers to qualify for
a quantity discount has been obvious on the face of the discount plan.
On those grounds the courts and the Commission have upheld quantity
discounts requiring the purchase of only a negligible amount of pro-
duct that is obviously within the purchasing range of all customers.''
Frequently, however, it has not been obvious on the face of a quanti-
ty discount plan that the discount would be achievable by a seller's
average small customers. In those cases the courts and the Commission
have examined customers' actual experience under the plan to deter-
mine whether the discount was available to them. When a significant
percentage of customers did not take advantage of the discount, 0 2 or
when a large number of smaller customers found it necessary to form
cooperative buying associations to qualify for the discount, 10 3 the
courts and the Commission have inferred that the requirements for
qualification were in fact too onerous for the plan to be deemed avail-
able to all customers. If, however, only a small minority of customers
failed to take advantage of the quantity discount, the use of the dis-
tends to direct business to the discounting seller and away from his competitors. Such plans also
may be illegal in the secondary line when certain customers are unable to purchase the requisite
amount of their requirements from a particular seller because of the inherent nature of their busi-
ness. In a recent advisory opinion, Herman Miller, [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 21,391 (1978), the Commission pointed out that a discount conditioned upon a
customer's agreement not to deal in competitive products would not be available to customers
who might need to fill a portion of their requirements from competitive sources. The Commission
concluded that such a discount therefore would be discriminatory as against such customers.
101. See Hanson v. PPG Indus., Inc., 482 F.2d 220, 235 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1136 (1974) (upholding discount requiring purchase of at least twenty-four windshields); In re
Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537, 543-44 (1937) (upholding discount available to any
customer willing to handle at least five dollars worth of seller's products within two or three week
period). See also In re Sunbeam Corp., 67 F.T.C. 20, 26-27 (1965) (upholding under § 2(d) pro-
motional allowance requiring purchase of at least $440 worth of seller's product).
102. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) (only five customers out of several thou-
sand obtained discount); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, [1968] Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,445
(7th Cir. 1967) (more than half of customers received no discount); American Can Co. v. Bruce's
Juices, Inc., 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), cert. drmirsed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951) (98% of customers did not
qualify for discount); In re Atlantic Prods. Corp., 63 F.T.C. 2237 (1963) (85-90% of seller's cus-
tomers did not utilize discount); In re Shreveport Macaroni Mfg. Co., 60 F.T.C. 196 (1962), aft'd,
321 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 971 (1964) (only two customers received pro-
motional allowances); In re Bulova Watch Co., 48 F.T.C. 971 (1952) (8,000 customers failed to
qualify).
103. See United Biscuit Co. of America v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
926 (1965); Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, [1956] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,527 (8th Cir.). The courts
have emphasized in such cases that a quantity discount is not available to a customer when he is
required to alter his independent business status in order to receive the discount.
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count by the great majority of customers was deemed sufficient to evi-
dence the discount's equal availability to all.1°
This quantitative standard used by the courts and the Commission to
determine the legality of quantity discounts is somewhat disturbing.
Under the rationale of the availability defense, a seller should not be
excused from liability if any of his customers is arbitrarily denied a
quantity discount by virtue of the customer's business status. Further-
more, a quantity discount whose prerequisites are truly achievable by
all of a seller's customers should not be held illegal merely because a
significant percentage of customers freely choose not to take advantage
of the discount. To avoid this result, if the availability of a quantity
discount is not apparent on the face of the discount plan, it would be
preferable for the trier of fact to examine the customer's capability to
qualify for the discount, rather than to view as controlling the actual
experience of the majority of customers.
A few cases have indicated that the availability defense may apply to
a discount plan that is somewhat unattractive to customers, provided
the customers are economically capable by qualifying for the discount
plan. A customer may, for example, prefer not to purchase the requi-
site amount of product from a particular seller or to meet certain other
prerequisites of a seller's discount plan. If, however, the customer has
the capability to meet those prerequisites, the discount should be
deemed to be available to him, regardless of whether the customer con-
siders the promotion attractive enough to take advantage of it.105 The
104. See In re Standard Brands, Inc., 29 F.T.C. 121, 140 (1939) (favorable price available to
"great majority" of customers), rev'd on other grounds, 30 F.T.C. 1117, 1136-37 (1940), afl'd, 189
F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951). See also In re Surprise Brassiere Co., 71 F.T.C. 868, 959 (1967) (uphold-
ing under § 2(d) advertising allowance available to all customers "except perhaps a very few with
a volume of purchases so small that their ... exclusion from the plan might be regarded as de
minimus.").
105. Several cases have upheld the availability of discounts requiring customers to purchase a
product in quantities that may have been unattractive to them, but which were nevertheless within
their purchasing capabilities. See Hanson v. PPG Indus., Inc., 482 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1973), cer.
denied, 414 U.S. 1136; In re Sunbeam Corp., 67 F.T.C. 20 (1965); In re American Optical Co., 28
F.T.C. 169 (1939); In re Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937). Other cases have vali-
dated discounts requiring customers to pay for a product within an accelerated period of time that
many customers found inconvenient to meet. See cases cited in note 26, supra. In Corn Prods.
Ref. Co. v. FTC, 144 F.2d 211, 220 (7th Cir. 1944), aj'd, 324 U.S. 726 (1945), the Seventh Circuit
upheld a discount related to the size of shipping containers, an arrangement which was obviously
more attractive to some customers than to others. In United Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 362
F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1966), the price discrimination charge was based on the defendant's offer to load




availability defense should apply if the customer makes the decision
not to use the discount on the basis of his own business preferences
rather than because of his inability to meet the plan's prerequisites.
The foregoing analysis indicates that a standard quantity discount
plan should be upheld under the availability defense if (1) it is offered
in writing to all of a seller's direct or indirect purchasers competing on
each distribution level to which the seller directly markets his product
under the plan, and (2) it includes objective standards for qualification
within the capabilities of all those purchasers. Such a discount should
be deemed legal on each distribution level regardless of whether sev-
eral customers fail to take advantage of the discount because it is not
sufficiently attractive to them.'06
V. DISTRIBUTOR INCENTIVE DISCOUNT PLANS AND THE
AVAILABILITY DEFENSE
Some sellers may wish to employ quantity discount plans that are
more flexible than the standard quantity discounts discussed above. In-
stead of requiring each distributor to purchase the same absolute
amount of product regardless of the distributor's size or marketing po-
tential, a seller may want to tailor the prerequisites of his discount plan
to each distributor's individual business circumstances. Because such
discount plans can be designed to encourage each distributor to devote
the maximum effort to the resale of the seller's product consistent with
that distributor's marketing capabilities, plans of this nature are often
referred to as "incentive discount plans." The prerequisites of an in-
cry because the complainant could have utilized railroad cars, but instead, because of greater
speed and economy, chose to ship by trucks. In Mowery v. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, 463 F.
Supp. 762 (N.D. Ohio 1976), a1&'d, 590 F.2d 335 (1978), the court stated in dicta that the availabil-
ity defense could apply to a discount on dealers' purchases of gasoline available only if the dealers
reduced their retail gasoline price by a specified amount greater than the amount of the discount.
The plan was obviously unattractive to many dealers. See also Advisory Opinion Digest No. 94,70
F.T.C. 1877-78 (1966), a § 2(d) case, in which a seller offered an alternate promotional plan to
those customers unable to employ the primary promotional plan. One customer, capable of using
the primary plan, wished to employ the alternate plan for private reasons. The Commission ruled
that the seller could refuse to make the alternate plan available to that customer because he could
have used the primary plan.
106. As discussed in notes 57 and 58 supra and accompanying text, the authorities' disagree-
ment over the proper theoretical basis of the availability defense leaves some question regarding
the applicability of the defense in the primary line. The preferred view appears to be, however,
that availability should prevent the illegality of a price differential on each competitive level. See
notes 59-68 supra and accompanying text.
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centive discount plan are typically phrased in terms of a formula re-
quiring each distributor to upgrade his resale of the seller's product in a
specified manner. The form of these plans may vary widely depending
upon a seller's specific marketing goals. Examples include plans re-
quiring a distributor: (1) To increase the amount of his purchases from
the seller by a specified percentage over the amount of his purchases
during an earlier base period; 107 (2) to purchase a specified percentage
of his total requirements from the seller rather than from the seller's
competitors; 08 (3) to resell the seller's product to a certain number of
applications previously supplied by a competitor;109 or (4) to reach a
particular sales quota negotiated by the seller and distributor." 0
The criteria of the availability defense described above in the context
of standard quantity discounts should apply equally to incentive dis-
count plans, because such plans are in effect a type of quantity dis-
count."' Both the standard quantity discount and the incentive
discount are granted in consideration of a customer's purchase of a par-
ticular quantity of product. The two discount plans differ only in the
manner in which the applicable quantity is defined. Under the incen-
tive discount the applicable quantity is specified in terms of a formula,
while the standard quantity discount requires the purchase of an abso-
lute quantity of product. Because of these similarities, an incentive dis-
count plan, like the standard quantity discounts discussed above,
should qualify for the availability defense only if the plan is offered to
all competing distributors" 2 and includes objective qualification stan-
dards that all distributors may achieve." 3
The principal advantage of the incentive discount over the standard
quantity discount is that its prerequisites need not be diminished as
significantly to make the discount achievable by all competing distribu-
tors. As discussed in Section IV, a seller often can insure that a stan-
dard quantity discount will be upheld on its face under the availability
defense only by making the applicable quantities low enough to be ob-
107. See Section VI(a) infra for an analysis of the legality of such a plan.
108. See Section VI(b) infra.
109. See Section VI(c) infra.
110. See Section VI(d) infra.
111. See FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., [1976-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,103
(2d Cir.); Tosa Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., [1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH)
75,006 (E.D. Wis.).
112. See notes 84-92 supra and accompanying text.




viously within the purchasing range of his average small customers.
Such a discount plan would provide a seller's large distributors with
little incentive to aggressively market his product. Nevertheless, reduc-
ing the requisite quantities in this manner may be the only way for the
seller to prevent a court from using his distributors' actual experience
under the plan to measure the discount's legality. Under that standard,
a court may find the quantity discount illegal simply because several
distributors chose not to take advantage of the discount for private rea-
sons, even though they may have been economically capable of quali-
fying for the discount." 4
Under an incentive discount plan a seller should be able to avoid
that result and still impose rather onerous resale requirements upon his
distributors. Because the prerequisites of such a plan are specified in a
formula rather than in absolute quantities, the seller can more easily
tailor the plan's requirements to each distributor's maximum resale ca-
pabilities. If the incentive plan requires each distributor to upgrade his
resale of the seller's product in a manner that is obviously achievable
by the distributor, the plan should be deemed valid on its face, even
though it may require the distributor to undertake rather burdensome
promotional efforts." 5 The flexibility of an incentive discount plan
thus allows a seller to aggressively promote his product while avoiding
the uncertainties inherent in a court's inquiry into customers' actual
experience under a discount plan.
VI. INCENTIVE DISCOUNT PLANS THAT SHOULD BE DEEMED
PRESUMPTIVELY LEGAL
The extent to which a seller can insure the presumptive legality of his
incentive discount plan will depend upon his marketing objectives
under the plan. To qualify for the availability defense," 6 each plan
114. See notes 102-04 supra and accompanying text.
115. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
116. The availability defense may be the only possible defense for a seller implementing an
incentive discount because the cost justification and meeting competition defenses are difficult to
sustain in quantity discount cases. See note 76 supra and accompanying text. Indeed, those de-
fenses may be even more difficult to sustain under particular incentive discount plans. Because
the prerequisites of certain incentive discounts are not phrased in terms of a customer's purchase
of an absolute quantity of product, a seller would not know in advance the actual amount of
product a customer might purchase pursuant to the plan and would therefore be unable to make
the calculations necessary for the cost justification defense. The meeting competition defense also
probably would not apply to certain incentive discounts, because most sellers would be more
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must include objective qualification standards which are disclosed in
writing to all distributors on each competitive level to which the seller
markets his product pursuant to the plan. I" The greatest difficulty in-
heres, however, in devising a plan with prerequisites that meet a seller's
promotional requirements yet appear on their face to be equally attain-
able by all distributors.
A. Plans Based Upon Relationship Between Current
and Prior Purchases
A seller may wish to base a discount on a distributor achieving a
specified relationship between current purchases from the seller and
purchases during an earlier base period." 8 The seller may, for exam-
ple, condition the discount upon a distributor achieving a specified per-
centage increase in current purchases over purchases during the base
period. A less aggressive seller concerned merely with avoiding any
significant erosion in sales might base the discount on a distributor's
success in maintaining current purchases at the base period level or not
allowing current purchases to fall more than a specified percentage be-
low the earlier level. Such incentive discount plans have the obvious
advantage of encouraging all distributors, regardless of size, to main-
tain or increase their sales of the seller's product in the specified man-
ner. Discounts may also be more attainable by small distributors under
such a plan than under a standard quantity discount, for it may often
be easier for those distributors to achieve the requisite relationship be-
tween current and base year purchases than to purchase the absolute
volumes of product specified under a standard quantity discount.
If an incentive plan requires distributors to achieve relatively large
percentage increases in purchases over the base period, however, cer-
tain distributors may be able to demonstrate that the discount is not
equally available to them. Under such a percentage increase plan,
likely to institute such discounts independently to accomplish their own marketing goals, rather
than to copy a competitor's plan.
117. See notes 111-13 supra and accompanying text.
118. The requisite relationship between current and prior purchases could be computed either
in terms of unit or dollar volume of product. The use of unit volume as a basis for computation
has the advantage of protecting both the seller and his distributors against aberrations resulting
from price inflation or deflation. If the relationship were based on dollar volume of purchases, the
distributor would obviously have an undue advantage when the seller increased the purchase
price from the base period purchase price, and the seller would have an undue advantage upon




larger distributors would have to increase their sales by a greater abso-
lute amount than smaller distributors to receive a discount.1 19 Distrib-
utors who conduct a general resale business might encounter greater
difficulty in focusing their promotional efforts to increase demand for
the seller's product by the requisite percentage than would distributors
who specialized in the seller's product. 2 ' Distributors whose own cus-
tomers required competitive products consequently might be unable to
increase their purchases of the seller's product by the required percent-
age.' 2 ' Other distributors operating in an area of relatively static de-
mand for the seller's product would be disadvantaged as against
distributors in areas experiencing a relatively sharp increase in de-
mand. A similar disadvantage would accrue to distributors whose sales
of the product happened to have been abnormally high during the base
period from which the requisite percentage increase in purchases is
computed.
No clear authority exists regarding the exact percentage relationship
between a distributor's current and prior purchases that will be deemed
achievable by all distributors in a particular situation. Indeed, the va-
lidity of incentive discounts based upon the relationship between a dis-
tributor's current and prior purchases has not yet been litigated before
the courts or the Commission. Several Commission advisory opinions,
however, have indicated that a requirement to achieve extreme percent-
age increases will be deemed to be beyond the capabilities of most dis-
tributors. In those opinions the Commission declared that incentive
plans requiring a distributor to achieve a fifty percent increase in
purchases over prior periods to qualify for a discount may be illegal. 2
If it is obvious that a fifty percent increase in purchases is usually too
difficult a requirement, a plan requiring a distributor merely to match
his purchases during a prior period should be deemed reasonable in
119. See In re Scott Publishing Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
20,196 (1973) (Commission advisory opinion declaring illegal graduated discounts based on per-
centage by which customer's quarterly purchases exceeded purchases from seller one year earlier,
Commission pointed out disadvantage to larger distributors).
120. "The general retailer may claim that it is easier for his competition to concentrate his
efforts and, thereby, increase his sales of the product involved." E. KiNTNER, supra note 22, at
200.
121. There is authority that under these circumstances the discount would constitute an illegal
price discrimination in the secondary line. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
122. See In re Baumgold Bros., Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
20,602 (1974); In re Scott Publishing Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
20,196 (1973); 16 C.F.R. § 15.153 (1980).
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most circumstances." 3 Despite the absence of direct authority, such a
plan appears to be consistent with the availability defense. Discounts
calculated on the basis of each distributor's own demonstrated purchas-
ing capabilities generally should be achievable by all distributors re-
gardless of their size or market circumstance.
There may be certain unusual market circumstances in which distrib-
utors would find it impossible even to match their base period
purchases, such as during periods of particularly weak demand for the
seller's product. Conversely, during periods of unusually strong de-
mand for the product distributors may be able to achieve a significant
percentage increase in their purchases from the seller. A seller can pro-
tect himself from the problems of availability raised by such unusual
market circumstances by frequently revising the requirements of his in-
centive plan. For example, in times of general declining demand for
the seller's product it may be reasonable for the seller to require distrib-
utors to purchase only eighty percent of what they had bought in prior
periods, while in times of general increasing demand the seller may
require distributors to increase their purchases by twenty percent.
Even in times of increasing demand for the seller's product, circum-
stances may arise in which the seller may not be able to require all of
his distributors to increase their purchases. Percentage increase re-
quirements may, for example, be deemed discriminatory against dis-
tributors who already had been purchasing all or substantially all of
their requirements from the seller during the applicable base period,
because those distributors may not be able to satisfy their occasional
need for competitive products and continue to qualify for discounts
under the plan.' 4 A seller, therefore, should devise a method for such
distributors to participate in his incentive plan, either by reducing the
requisite percentage increase or crediting occasional competitive
purchases toward the amount of purchases required of the distributors
under the plan.
An incentive discount based upon the relationship between distribu-
tors' current and prior purchases certainly should be deemed to dis-
criminate against new distributors, who would be excluded by virtue of
123. In In re Scott Publishing Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE RE. REP. (CCH) 1
20,196 (1973), the Commission stated that a "legally inoffensive" incentive program might be
devised if all distributors with any increase in volume over a specified earlier period received the
same discount.
124. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
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having no base period purchases from which the seller could determine
their entitlement to a discount. For such a plan to be upheld, therefore,
a seller would have to devise a method by which new distributors could
participate.1 25  For example, a seller might assign a base period
purchase quantity to each new distributor that is comparable to the
actual base period purchase quantities of established distributors who
are otherwise similarly situated.'2 6 Purchases by the new distributor
bearing the requisite relationship to the assigned base period purchase
quantity would entitle the distributor to a discount under the plan.' 27
An incentive discount plan requiring distributors to maintain or rea-
sonably increase their purchases over a prior period, which takes into
account unusual market circumstances, distributors' occasional need to
purchase competitive products, and the right of new distributors to par-
ticipate, should be deemed valid on its face. Despite the absence of
direct authority, the general rationale of the availability defense indi-
cates that a seller should be deemed to have treated his distributors as
equally as possible under such a plan. Each distributor should have a
practical opportunity to qualify for a discount under such a plan in the
ordinary course of his business. Each distributor also should be aware
at the plan's inception of the risks associated with participation in the
plan. 28 Therefore, no distributor should be able to assert later that the
125. In In re Scott Publishing Co., 11970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1
20,196 (1973), one of the Commission's grounds for concluding that an incentive plan based on
increased purchases over a prior period would be illegal was the fact that new customers could not
qualify under the plan.
126. A seller might use several methods of assigning a base period purchase quantity to new
distributors. One method for distributors who had previously marketed comparable products
would be to use the actual amount of competitive products marketed by those distributors during
the base period.
127. Assume, for example, that one of the seller's distributors purchased $100,000 worth of the
relevant product in the prior year and must purchase 10% more of the product in the current year
to qualify for a discount. It should be acceptable for the seller to assign $100,000 as the base
period purchase quantity for a new distributor of similar size and marketing capabilities, and to
require that distributor to purchase $I 10,000 worth of product in the current year in order to
qualify.
128. An incentive plan that may mislead potential participants as to their ability to qualify for
discounts under the plan may be illegal. In one advisory opinion the Commission, in declaring a
pyramid-type incentive plan illegal, emphasized the plan's appeal to small distributors who might
not understand its risks. Under that plan, discounts were based on the number of new distributors
recruited by each distributor participating in the plan. See 16 C.F.R. § 15.155 (1980). See also
National Nut Co. of Calif. v. Kelling Nut Co., [1944-19451 Trade Cas. (CCH) 57,405 (N.D. Ill.
1944) (dicta that discount based on chance, such as one based on a customer sending in additional
customers to the seller, would be illegal). In contrast, the risks associated with incentive plans of
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plan was unlawful merely because changing economic circumstances
made the plan unattractive to him. 29
B. Plans Based Upon Requirements Purchases
Instead of merely requiring his distributors to maintain or increase
their resale volume, a seller may wish to encourage his distributors
more directly to increase his product's market penetration. One way to
accomplish this objective is to base an incentive discount upon a dis-
tributor's purchase of a specified percentage of his requirements from
the seller. Such a plan should encourage distributors who would other-
wise promote competitive products to concentrate a greater portion of
their resale activities on the seller's product.
At first glance, incentive discounts based upon requirements
purchases appear to raise fewer availability questions than do discounts
based upon distributors achieving a specified relationship between cur-
rent and prior purchases. New distributors generally should not be
precluded from participating in requirements incentive plans.' 30 Fur-
thermore, distributors who because of their size or market circum-
stances find it difficult to achieve the requisite relationship between
current and prior purchases might experience less difficulty in changing
the overall mix of their purchases from various sources to qualify for
discounts under a requirements incentive plan.
A requirements incentive plan nevertheless does have certain disad-
vantages. First, from a business standpoint, such a plan merely encour-
ages distributors to increase the seller's percentage share of a particular
market; the plan does not encourage distributors to expand the size of
the entire market. Thus a seller increasing his market penetration
under such a plan might be left with a static or even declining absolute
the type described in this Section VI should be readily understood by distributors, because such
plans are based upon the distributors' own resale potential.
129. Discounts whose prerequisites have been merely unattractive to customers, as opposed to
being beyond their capabilities, are considered "available" to those customers. See note 105 supra
and accompanying text.
130. If, however, the plan requires distributors to increase the proportion of their requirements
purchased from the seller by a specified percentage over the proportion purchased during a prior
period, the seller should devise a method to allow new distributors to participate. See notes 125-
27 supra and accompanying text. The seller might, for example, merely specify a reasonable per-
centage of total requirements that all new distributors must purchase to qualify for the discount.
Such an arrangement would be consistent with the seller's over-all discount plan, because the new
distributors obviously would be purchasing a greater proportion of their requirements from the




volume of sales in a diminishing market. Further, potential legal
problems associated with a requirements incentive plan increase as a
seller requires his distributors to purchase a greater percentage of their
requirements from him. It is possible, for example, that discounts
under a plan requiring distributors to purchase all or substantially all
of their requirements from a seller might be deemed to be unavailable
to distributors who must purchase a portion of their requirements from
the seller's competitors to meet the specifications of their own custom-
ers. Commission advisory opinions and consent orders indicate that
such incentive plans may violate section 2(a) in the secondary line. 13
In addition, because a requirements incentive plan directly encourages
distributors to divert business from the seller's competitors, primary
line suits might be particularly likely under such a plan.' 32 Because of
the uncertainties in the conceptual basis of the availability defense, a
seller might be unable to successfully defend such a primary line suit
on the ground that the incentive plan was equally available to all his
distributors. 33 Finally, if a seller expressly requires his distributors to
purchase all their requirements from him under such an incentive plan,
the plan may be deemed an illegal requirements contract under section
1 of the Sherman Act or section 3 of the Clayton Act when the requisite
adverse competitive effect can be demonstrated.13 4
Therefore, to guarantee the presumptive legality of a requirements
incentive discount plan, a seller may be forced to base his discount on a
distributor's purchase of less than a substantial portion of his require-
ments from the seller. This necessity obviously may contradict the
seller's marketing goals.
131. See Herman Miller, [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,391
(1978) (FTC advisory opinion); In re Maguire Indus., Inc., 55 F.T.C. 306 (1958) (consent order).
The Maguire consent order prohibited a seller from discriminating in price by paying a 10% an-
nual rebate to those customers whose purchases from the seller equalled their purchases from all
sources during the previous year, a 7 % rebate to those whose purchases equalled 75% of previous
requirements, and a 5% rebate to those whose purchases equalled 50% of previous requirements.
132. The Commission has recognized the primary line effects of such quantity discounts in
citing the "inherent tying effect" of discounts requiring a customer to purchase all or substantially
all of his requirements for a product from a particular seller. See notes 77-79 supra and accompa-
nying text.
133. See notes 57 and 58 supra and accompanying text. The preferred view appears to be,
however, that the availability of the incentive plan to all competing customers should prevent a
finding of illegality in any line of commerce. See notes 59-68 supra and accompanying text.
134. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
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C. Plans Based Upon Sales Displacing Competitive Products
A requirements discount plan is not the only type of incentive dis-
count a seller may use to encourage his distributors to increase market
penetration. A seller also may base a discount on his distributors enter-
ing into individual transactions that have the effect of displacing a com-
petitor's product in favor of the seller's product. One such incentive
plan provides for a distributor to receive a discount with respect to each
sale made by the distributor for an application in which a competitor's
product had been utilized previously. Each of a seller's distributors,
regardless of size or market circumstance, should have an equal oppor-
tunity to make individual sales for such applications. This type of in-
centive plan thus avoids the availability problems inherent in other
discount plans requiring distributors to purchase certain quantities of
products that may exceed their capabilities. 3 Such plans therefore
should be found on their face to be equally available to all competing
distributors.' 36 Indeed, in a recent case the Second Circuit expressly
found that an incentive discount based upon distributors' resale of the
seller's product to certain specified applications should be upheld under
the availability defense.'37
The legality of an incentive discount based on sales displacing com-
petitive products nevertheless may be questionable when, rather than
being granted with respect to each qualifying sale, the discount is avail-
able only to distributors who meet a threshold requirement for a cer-
tain cumulative number of such sales within a specified period. This
type of plan is more likely to be deemed unavailable to certain distribu-
tors because of market circumstances beyond their control. New dis-
135. See notes 93-104 supra and accompanying text.
136. As in the case of requirements incentive plans, however, incentive plans based upon sales
displacing competitive products carry a great potential for primary line suits because of their
direct impact upon a seller's competitors. The uncertainties in the conceptual basis of the availa-
bility defense raise questions concerning a seller's ability to defend such primary line suits on the
ground that the incentive plan was equally available to all his distributors. See notes 57-68 supra
and accompanying text.
137. See FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., [1976-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,103
(2d Cir.), in which Ford offered a discount on its dealers' purchases of automobile parts for resale
to independent automobile repair shops. The discount was not available on dealers' purchases of
such parts for their own use or for resale to wholesalers such as FLM. FLM claimed that the
incentive plan violated § 2(a) because Ford sold the same product at different prices to competing
dealers depending upon those dealers' resale activities. The court held that the plan did not vio-
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tributors in a particular market area might be unable to locate and
solicit the requisite number of favored applications for the seller's
product. Established distributors also might be precluded by the na-
ture of their business from sufficiently focusing their marketing efforts
to achieve the requisite number of sales to such applications. 38 Under
this type of plan distributors also would be less capable of accurately
assessing their chances of qualifying for a discount, for it would be dif-
ficult for a distributor to determine in advance the number of applica-
tions within his marketing area in which he could replace a competitive
product with the seller's product. The uncertain risks associated with
participation in the plan may suffice by themselves to prove the plan's
illegality under section 2(a). t39
Although each of the incentive discount plans discussed above offers
a seller greater flexibility in encouraging the aggressive resale of his
product than does the standard quantity discount, it appears that a
seller must still temper his distributors' resale requirements to some ex-
tent to guarantee that such incentive discounts will be upheld under the
availability defense. Unless a seller does so, his incentive discount plan
should not be deemed to be legal on its face, and the seller will be faced
with the uncertainty of whether, upon further inquiry, a court will find
the favorable market circumstances necessary to prove the plan's equal
138. A distributor engaged in a general resale business, for example, might experience greater
difficulty in redirecting his marketing program to solicit the favored accounts than would another
distributor who specialized in the resale of the seller's product. A distributor whose marketing
efforts traditionally had been directed toward established accounts and who lacked the experience
and resources to redirect his marketing program to attract new accounts might have a similar
disadvantage.
139. Incentive discounts based on chance or on risks not readily apparent to distributors at the
inception of the plan may be considered discriminatory under § 2(a). 16 C.F.R. § 15.155 (1980)
states that a discount plan based on distributors' recruitment of additional distributors would be
discriminatory because it appealed to distributors who would not be likely to appreciate the risks
associated with the plan. Similarly, in National Nut Co. of Calif. v. Kelling Nut Co., [1944-1945]
Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 57,405 (N.D. Ill. 1944), the court stated in dicta that a discount allowed by
chance, such as one based on one customer sending another customer to the seller, would be
illegal. Arguably, a requirement to replace a competitor's product with the seller's product in a
specified number of applications is more subject to chance and to unknown risks than the other
incentive discounts discussed in Section VI, because of: (1) The unlikelihood of the existence of a
sufficient number of qualifying applications available for solicitation by a distributor; and (2) a
distributor's initial difficulty in assessing the number of potential qualifying applications before
entering the incentive plan. In contrast, a distributor should be able to assess with relative ease his
opportunity to qualify for a discount under an incentive plan requiring him to achieve a specified
relationship between his current and prior purchases, or to purchase a certain percentage of his
requirements from the seller.
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availability to all distributors. Under each such incentive discount
plan, therefore, there is a continuing tension between the provisions
necessary to meet the requirements of the Robinson-Patman Act and
the provisions necessary to meet the seller's own marketing goals.
D. Plans Based Upon Sales Quotas
Incentive discount plans based upon a distributor's achieving a par-
ticular sales quota appear to reconcile most completely the tension be-
tween the requirements of the Robinson-Patman Act and a seller's
need to encourage the aggressive promotion of his product. Under the
typical sales quota incentive plan a seller sets a particular volume of
product as a sales quota for each of his distributors during a specified
period. Each distributor receives a discount if he purchases the product
during that period in an amount at least equal to the sales quota. 40
The sales quota may be specified in terms of the number of units or
dollar value of the seller's product purchased by a distributor. The
seller individually negotiates the particular size of the sales quota with
each distributor. The quota therefore may vary substantially in size
from one distributor to another.
Although the necessity of individually negotiating a sales quota with
each distributor may be burdensome for some sellers, the negotiation
process may be the greatest advantage of the sales quota incentive plan
from both a business and legal standpoint. A seller who carries out the
negotiation process carefully should be able to insure that he receives
the maximum possible promotional benefit from his distributors and
that his sales quota incentive plan will be deemed valid on its face
under the Robinson-Patman Act.
In negotiating a sales quota with each distributor, a seller should
consistently attempt to relate the quota to the distributor's maximum
resale capabilities. By carefully determining with each distributor his
maximum sales potential, a seller can insure that the quotas under his
incentive plan are set to reward only those distributors who make the
greatest effort to promote the resale of his product. Being aware of the
special promotional capabilities and position of each of his distributors
in the overall market, the seller can adopt sales quotas that will en-
140. For example, an incentive plan might specify a sales quota of $100,000 for a particular
distributor in the current contract year and allow that distributor to receive a discount or rebate
equal to a specified percentage of the value of his total purchases for that year, provided that those




courage each distributor to increase both his absolute volume of resales
and the market penetration of the seller's product.
As long as each distributor's sales quota accurately reflects the mu-
tual determination of the seller and distributor of the maximum
amount of product which the distributor is capable of selling in his
market area during the period of the incentive plan, no distributor
should be able to claim that he has been illegally discriminated against
under the plan.' 4' During the sales quota negotiations each distributor
should become fully apprised of the risks associated with participation
in the plan. Because the distributor has participated in the process by
which the sales quota is determined, he should not be able to assert
later that the initial quota was set beyond his capabilities.
To insure that the negotiation process produces a sales quota that is
truly within each distributor's capabilities, a seller must be flexible in
adapting particular sales quotas to the business circumstances of his
distributors. This flexibility should allow a seller to eliminate, to the
extent possible, the elements of chance that make it difficult for some
distributors to qualify for a sales quota incentive discount. For exam-
ple, a seller may negotiate relatively low sales quotas for smaller dis-
tributors, for new distributors establishing themselves in the market, or
for other distributors who are unable to sustain large resale volumes of
the seller's product because of market conditions beyond their control.
A seller also should avoid adopting sales quotas so high that they
require a distributor to purchase all or substantially all of his require-
ments from the seller. In this way the seller can minimize his exposure
to primary line suits, 42 prevent the incentive plan from being deemed
to discriminate against distributors who must purchase a portion of
their requirements from competitors,' 43 and avoid the construction of
the incentive plan as an illegal requirements contract under section 1 of
the Sherman Act or section 3 of the Clayton Act.'"
141. If, however, the seller employs a graduated discount plan based upon incremental in-
creases in purchases beyond each distributor's sales quota (e.g., a one percent discount on the
value of purchases up to 10% in excess of the sales quota, a two percent discount on purchases up
to 20% in excess of the quota, etc.), the discount plan probably will be held illegal on the ground
that the highest discounts are not achievable by all distributors because the base sales quota itself
is calculated on the projected maximum resale capability of each distributor. Thus, any sales in
excess of the quota would be purely fortuitous.
142. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
143. See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
144. See note 6 supra.
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Because of the flexible standard a seller may use to determine each
distributor's sales quota, the seller must avoid the appearance that cer-
tain distributors have been unduly favored by being granted sales quo-
tas that are more lenient than those to which they would ordinarily be
entitled on the basis of their size or market circumstance. A seller can
avoid an appearance of favoritism by insuring that each distributor's
sales quota constitutes the maximum amount of product that distribu-
tor is capable of selling during the period of the incentive program. As
long as a seller attempts to do this in good faith, he should not be
deemed to have illegally discriminated in favor of distributors whose
sales quotas happen to be smaller because of their size or market situa-
tion.
To prove good faith in attempting to insure the equal availability of
a sales quota incentive discount, a seller would be well advised to offer
each of his distributors a written contract specifying the distributor's
sales quota and the other conditions of participation in the incentive
program.'45 The contract should include a statement indicating that
each sales quota represents the mutual determination by the seller and
distributor of the maximum amount of the seller's product that the dis-
tributor could reasonably resell during the period of the incentive plan.
To avoid the problems inherent in requirements incentive plans, 46 the
contract also should include a representation by the distributor that he
is capable of achieving the sales quota without purchasing all or sub-
stantially all of his product requirements from the seller.
The seller should devise a continuing notification program under
which he offers the sales quota incentive discount contract to all new
distributors.'47 The seller should offer the contract to all competing
distributors on each functional level in the distribution chain in which
the sales quota incentive discount is available. If, for example, a seller
offers a sales quota incentive plan to distributors only for their resale of
product in a wholesale capacity, only competing wholesale distributors
need be offered the incentive discount. If, however, the seller offers the
145. A seller should be permitted to require his distributors to enter into a contract as a condi-
tion of participation in a sales quota incentive plan. As long as the contract has been made avail-
able to the distributors, they should not be able to argue that they were discriminated against
under § 2(a) merely because they found it unattractive to enter into a formal written agreement
with the seller. Several cases have upheld discount prerequisites that, although unattractive to
customers, were nevertheless within their capabilities. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
146. See notes 77-80, 131-34 supra and accompanying text.




incentive plan both to wholesalers and to retailers, or to "dual-func-
tion" distributors for both wholesale and retail sales, the seller may be
required to make the plan available to competing firms on both the
wholesale and retail level, regardless of whether those firms purchase
directly from the seller or indirectly through his wholesale distribu-
tors.1
48
A sales quota incentive plan appears to be best suited to a seller who
markets his product through a limited number of wholesale distribu-
tors. Such a seller should not find it unduly burdensome to negotiate
an individual sales quota with each of his distributors and thereby in-
sure that each competing distributor has an equal opportunity to qual-
ify for a discount under the sales quota incentive plan. If a seller
implements such an incentive plan in the manner described in this Arti-
cle, the plan should be found to satisfy the criteria of the availability
defense on its face, and to be presumptively valid under section 2(a).
Indeed, in a recent district court case a sales quota incentive plan simi-
lar to that described above was upheld on the ground that the individu-
ally negotiated sales quotas were "available" to each of the seller's
distributors. 149
VII. CONCLUSION
The availability defense derives from a recognition by the courts and
the Commission that a discount that is made equally available to all
competing customers should not constitute a form of illegal price dis-
crimination under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. This de-
fense frequently may be used to validate quantity discounts whose
prerequisites are within the capabilities of a seller's average small cus-
tomers. Because the availability defense often requires the trier of fact
to examine the particular circumstances of each case to determine
whether the discount was in fact achievable by small customers, how-
ever, a seller faces some legal uncertainties in attempting to draft a
valid quantity discount plan.
Incentive discount plans are a type of quantity discount that appear
to offer a seller the greatest flexibility in encouraging aggressive promo-
tion of his product while insuring that the discount will be deemed
148. See notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text.
149. Tosa Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., [1974-I] Trade Cas. (CCH)
75,006 (E.D. Wis.).
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available to all his distributors. A seller's marketing goals and his
needs for legal certainty can be achieved to varying degrees under in-
centive discount plans based on distributors' maintaining or increasing
their total purchases from the seller, purchasing a specified percentage
of their requirements from the seller, or making sales to applications
that had previously been supplied by the seller's competitors. A seller's
needs apparently can be achieved most completely, however, under an
incentive discount plan that requires each distributor to meet an indi-
vidually negotiated sales quota. A seller can insure in his negotiations
with each distributor that all sales quotas are set so as to encourage
each distributor to reach the maximum market penetration for the
seller's product reasonably achievable by the distributor. Under a sales
quota incentive plan the seller thus has the power to guarantee the
maximum promotional benefit for his product and the greatest cer-
tainty that his incentive plan will be upheld on its face under the avail-
ability defense.
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